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See Reverse for Instruction

T. A. Lizarraga Manager Health, Environment & Safety
Chevron Products Company P. O. Box 1272
Richmond, CA 94802-0272
Tel 510 242 1400
Fax 510 242 5353
hink@chevron.com

September 12, 2008

Ms. Carla Fritz
Cal OSHA Compliance Engineer
Department of Industrial Relations
Northern California Process Safety Management
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520

Cal OSHA Document Request Regarding TEL Facility Investigation

Dear Ms. Fritz

In response your latest document requests (reference e-mails from you to Mark Robinson and Pete Sarmicanic dated 9/3/08), please find attached our Operating Integrity Assessment for the No. 1 Lead Line. Using a variety of procedures widely used in the industry for evaluating piping applications, the assessment estimated potential failure pressures in the 756 to 1042 PSI range. Since the piping system has a normal operating pressure range of 75 to 200 PSI with a maximum of 250 PSI a safety factor of at least three times likely failure pressure has existed since the inspection of 3/27/03. Additionally, since the likely mechanism of failure was due to localized corrosion pitting, any failure prior to repairs conducted in August 2008 would most likely have resulted in a small leak, and not catastrophic failure of the line.

The refinery follows API RP-570, Title 8 Section 6533, and our internal Chevron California Piping Standard when conducting an initial engineering review of piping. Agency review and approval of a written Fitness for Service program is not required for piping systems per Title 8 Section 6553.

I trust that this response aids you in concluding your investigation of the allegations related to this matter. However, if you have additional questions, please call or e-mail Mr. Mark Robinson at (510) 242-2233 or markrobinson@chevron.com.

Original Signed By T. A. Lizarraga

T. A. Lizarraga

Attachment

Recipient Name Company Name August 1, 2005 Page 2

> bcc:J Buchanan M Robinson M Brennan P Canzius



Energy Technology Company Facilities Engineering 100 Chevron Way, Bldg. 10-2520 Richmond, CA 94801 Tel 510-242-7218 Fax 510-242-4614 davebosi@chevron.com

Richmond, California September 12, 2008

Richmond Refinery – Operating Integrity Assessment of the Blending and Shipping Plant No. 1 Lead Line

T. Lizarraga

BACKGROUND

The subject 4-inch, A-53 carbon steel, schedule standard, aviation fuel gas transfer line (or 1 Lead Line) has sustained corrosion damage at several locations over its length. The corrosion is primarily external, however a Plant inspection report, dated 27 March 2003, also notes local areas of internal corrosion.

On 20 August Chevron ETC was contacted to participate with Plant staff in completing a walkdown inspection of the entire line. The objective of the inspection was to review the previously documented locations of corrosion damage and visually determine the most severe metal loss location. Subsequently non-destructive examination (NDE) was completed to determine the through-thickness condition of the pipe at the location of most severe external corrosion damage.

The Plant advised that the 1 Lead Line was shutdown and would not return to service prior to completion of qualified welded and/or mechanical clamp (encapsulation) repairs. In the interim the Plant requested that a pressure boundary integrity assessment of the limiting corrosion damaged area be completed to quantitatively establish its former in-service failure threshold.

T. Lizarraga
Richmond Refinery – Operating Integrity Assessment of the Blending and Shipping Plant
Lead Line

September 12, 2008 Page 2

Analysis

Based on ASME B31.3 piping code stipulated visual (VT) and radiographic (RT) inspection techniques, both ETC and Plant staff (K. Gish) concurred that the limiting locally corroded region of the 1 Lead Line would be fully bounded, on minimum thickness, by an idealized uniform 0.1 inch remaining pipe wall thickness, with the inclusion of a local pit having a 0.25 inch diameter and a depth of 0.05 inches, as compared to the nominal new condition of 0.237 inches wall thickness.

The transfer line material is ASTM A-53 carbon steel and it was conservatively assumed to have the lowest strength¹ properties as defined by the Grade A specification. Specifically, the material yield strength, at ambient and low temperatures (200 °F), is 30 ksi, the ultimate strength is 48 ksi and the ASME B31.3 code membrane allowable stress is 16 ksi. The piping pressure induced hoop stress is governed by a membrane stress state, and thereby the stated allowable stress is utilized by the design code to establish the minimum required pipe wall thickness.

The location of the reported worst corrosion damage is near a deadweight pipe support. Field assessment² of the support and adjacent spans concluded that supplemental loading due to deadweight bending could be taken as negligible. The line operates essentially at ambient, so no meaningful thermal component of loading is developed.

Given the above simplified geometry and pressure-dominated loading basis, the described idealized defect can be evaluated by various closed-form strength, or rupture, evaluation procedures widely used in the industry for both process piping and pipeline applications. Table 1 tabulates these results and the detailed worksheets³ are attached in Appendix 1.

In Table 1 note that the NG-18 method is a determination basis for a leaking, or weeping, failure versus a catastrophic failure condition. In this case the pit has very low surface area, and a 50 percent depth relative to the surrounding pipe wall thickness. So intuitively the global failure result of NG-18 is sensible. Specifically, the 50 percent local pipe wall defect depth does not affect the global failure strength since its 0.049 square inch area is insufficient to locally reduce the apparent strength of the surrounding (thicker) pipe wall section.

Recognize that the NG-18 method is a discrete evaluation given the material conditions applied. The observed field condition is pitting corrosion where damage (material wastage) is highly biased on the bottom of the pit. Thus the eventual probable failure mode⁴ would be continued

¹ Recall that the code strength values are statistical lower bound values determined from numerous mill heats of the designated material specification.

² Per Jaan Taagepera, PE, ETC Senior Engineer, Engineering Analysis Group, who completed the walkdown inspection with Plant staff. Note also that the line is grade-mounted and thus no amplified in-structure seismic loading is applicable.

³ Acknowledgment to CP Hsiao who programmed the MathCad worksheets.

⁴ The NG-18 method was parametrically applied using progressively deeper pitting corrosion with a leak failure mode being predicted. The gross failure case is not deemed credible in light of the margin of three (3) safety factor.

T. Lizarraga

Richmond Refinery - Operating Integrity Assessment of the Blending and Shipping Plant 1 Lead Line

September 12, 2008

Page 3

corrosion in the pit resulting in a pin-hole breach of the remaining pit ligament, with consequent leaking. However, the surrounding corroded wall thickness (conservatively approximated as 0.1 inches thickness) would easily sustain the internal pressure loading stably after the pit breach.

The pit and corroded area combination failure capacity results of Table 1 clearly show that no threat of catastrophic failure existed from the as-found corrosion damage condition. All failure pressure magnitudes are commensurate with the approximate three (3) safety factor of the original ASME B31.3 piping design code. Specifically, the line maximum operating pressure is 250 psi and thus the margin against failure is greater than a factor of three (3). Note that the Kastner Method is limiting (i.e the lowest predicted failure pressure).

Table 1 Failure Pressure Predictions for a Pit Isolated in a Thinned Pipe Section

Method	Failure Pressure (psi)	Failure Mode
ASME B31.G	810	
RSTRENG (Modified B31.G)	978	
DNV RP-F101	1213	57.4
Shell-92	1059	NA
PCORRC	1142	
Kastner's Method	757	
NG-18	NA	Global / No Pit Failure

Although the failure pressure threshold of the analyzed defect is high the Plant decision to repair the line prior to a return to service is correct. Note that irrespective of analytical results, the various defect assessment codes, such as ASME-API-579 and B31.G, include guidance to repair metal loss defects below specified limits. ASME-API-579 stipulates 0.1 inches, while ASME B31.G uses a limit of 20 percent of the nominal pipe wall schedule thickness (i.e. 0.047 inches, as compared to a remaining thickness of 0.05 inches in this Blending and Shipping Plant case).

These limits are recommended primarily to assure ruggedness against external hazards such as stepping loads, impact due to dropped tools and other industrial hazards. In this case, the 0.25 inch diameter target area of the controlling exposed pit is so small that direct impact from such hazards is physically improbable.

Recognize that discovery of such metal loss defects, during operation, which are below recommended threshold limits may optionally be evaluated for short-term service integrity by detailed stress analysis methods. This is provided to allow reasonable time for staging of repair materials and craft.

T. Lizarraga

Richmond Refinery – Operating Integrity Assessment of the Blending and Shipping Plant 1 Lead Line

September 12, 2008

Page 4

Please call me if you have any questions or concerns.

Lavie M Josi

D. M. Bosi, P. E, State of California Staff Consulting Engineer

Distribution List:

R. Basco

J. Buchanan

K. Gish

CP Hsiao

D. Mason

M. Robinson

P. Sarmicanic

J. Taagepera

Richmond Electronic Repository MEEDOCS

T. Lizarraga
Richmond Refinery – Operating Integrity Assessment of the Blending and Shipping Plant 1
Lead Line
September 12, 2008
Page 5

Appendix 1

MathCad Burst Pressure Worksheets

(5 sheets follow)

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Chevron Products Company P. O. Box 1272
Richmond, CA 94802-0272
Tel 510 242 1400
Fax 510 242 5353
hink@chevron.com

August 28, 2008

Ms. Carla Fritz Cal OSHA Compliance Engineer Department of Industrial Relations Northern California Process Safety Management 1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 Concord, CA 94520

Cal OSHA Document Request Regarding TEL Facility Investigation

Dear Ms. Fritz

In response to Item #7 in your amended Document Request dated 8/18/08 (copy attached), please find attached our Inspection Recommendation #1621-03-03-27. This concerns an inspection of the #1 Lead Line which is used to circulate gasoline blend stock from the leaded gasoline tank down to the TEL storage and blend station and back to the tank. TEL is injected into this circulation line and mixed with the gasoline in the tank in order to properly blend aviation gasoline. This inspection report is dated 3/27/03 and includes a recommendation to replace approximately 700 feet of line due to internal and external corrosion. We were unable to find an inspection report dated 6/29/07. We believe that the 6/29/07 date mentioned in our PHA for the TEL Blending Facility was either a typographical error and/or may have been confused with the date of an MOC which was written on 6/21/07 to bypass the TEL storage drum and build a new temporary TEL blending manifold.

A subsequent Fitness for Service review was completed which concluded that the #1 Lead Line continues to be safe to operate. The existing piping will be replaced with an entirely new line as part of a project to build a new TEL unloading and blending facility which is scheduled for completion in February 2009.

For questions, please contact Mr. Mark Robinson at (510) 242-2233.

Original Signed ByMark Robinson

T. A. Lizarraga

Attachments

Recipient Name Company Name August 1, 2005 Page 2

> cc: J Buchanan M Robinson M Brennan P Canzius

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
No. CA Process Safety Management
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520

Ph.: (925) 602-2665 Fax.:(925) 602-2668

www.dir.ca.gov cfritz@dir.ca.gov

via email to: sarmipn@chevron.com

08/13/08

DOCUMENT REQUEST

(Amended 08/18/08)

TO:

Mark Robinson, Safety Team Lead

Chevron Products Co.

VIA:

Peter Sarmicanic, Field Safety Coordinator

FROM:

Carla Fritz

Cal OSHA Compliance Engineer

SUBJ:

Document Request 2 re: Complaint of Unsafe Working Conditions

Tetraethyl Lead Work Practices — Blending & Shipping

Thank you for providing the previously requested documents. My review of those documents has generated an additional request. Please provide the following documents postmarked no later than 08/24/08.

- 1) Disposition of all recommendations generated pursuant to the PHA's for the Temporary TEL Blending Facility
- 2) MOC # 17470 training date(s) & duration
- Disposition of Inspection Recommendation W/R 28096720 (06/05) to replace A-Drum nozzle N-3
- 4) Any & all recommendations generated pursuant to 6/05 identification of A-Drum "severely corroded" outlet piping & external corrosion "in all nozzles"
- 5) Any & all inspection records generated pursuant to discovery of A-Drum nozzle leak & subsequent repair
- 6) Any & all current monitoring data conducted during the revised TEL offload/blending procedure
- 7) Inspection report of 06/29/07 for 1-Lead line ("replace 700 ft")

Thank you in advance for your continued cooperation in this investigation.

Carla Fritz

No. CA Process Safety Management (925) 602-5779 (925) 602-2668 (fax)

Ref: 311070239





INSPECTION RECOMMENDATION

Fixed Equip. Reliability Equipment Reliability Group Richmond Refinery, Richmond CA

Richmond Refinery, Richmond C
I. RECO IDENTIFICATION:
RECO #: 1621-03-03-27#1 Lead Line PPT #: 28110507 Date Written: 3/27/03
Plant: Lwr. Main Tank Field Plt. Eqp. #: 1621-002-011 Brass Tag#: Next Opportunity RECO TYPE Information Only Cracking Hydro Next Opportunity Eng. Not Req'rd D&R Routine Other X B & S Service: Avgas W/Lead, Dye & Additive
II. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE:
Level 1 Review Summary NO Will new feeds, chemicals or catalysts be used? (See RI-313 for new chemicals, Oprs. Coord for new feeds) NO Will this work lead to operation outside established limits? Which Equipment? NO Is this repair or replacement other than "In-kind"? NO Does this involve developing new and / or modifying existing procedure? NO Does this work involve the addition of new equipment? (Send copy of the MOC form to EAD for new equipment) NO Will this impact upstream or downstream plants? If "YES" then which Plants? If any of the above questions were answered "YES", then a Level 2 review is required.
III. RECO INFORMATION (Summary and Details):
#1 Lead Line Inspection Results. REC-55216 Information
The #1 Lead Line was visually inspected and UT gauged for wall thickness per the API-570 10 year requirement. The line is corroding internally & externally. Numerous failed pipe supports were found from below T-3075 over to the Ethyl Mix Building on Standard Rd. approx. 1300 feet: Recommend installing new pipe supports. Due to the failed supports the line has been setting in soil & water causing the external corrosion. The combination of external corrosion and internal corrosion has left an average wall thickness of 0.05 in. (internal & external corrosion) to 0.20 in. (internal corrosion) (throwaway thickness is 0.10 in.) on the bottom side of the line (High probability of failures). Replacement of approx. 800 feet of the pipe is required in several locations. A section of the line is buried under Standard Rd. The condition of the line in this area is unknown: Excavation is required for inspection. Several dead legs, un-reinforced branch connections & mitered joints were also found. It is Inspections recommendation that this line be replaced from the tank to the Ethyl Plant and the pipe schedule be increased to heavy wall. The 3" branch to the dye mix building is corroding under the failed paint, recommend cleaning and re-coating the line. UPDATE 8-28-06; THE DAY LIGHTING & LIFTING OF THE LINE (RECO'S 1 & 2) WERE COMPLETED. ADDITIONAL PIPE REPLACEMENT & AND CLEANING & COATING ARE REQUIRED. REPLACED WORK ORDER #26146385 WITH A NEW WORK REQUEST.
Total Cost per Total Total Total Cost Estimate by: Man-Days Man-Day Labor Cost: M'trl. Cost: Cost:
Estimator X = + =
RECO APPROVAL (Enter Name & Phone):
Name Phone Name Phone rea Inspector: Shirley Tyree 2-2724 Engineering: Albert Carrillo 2.0470

ERG (FER - - Reco Form)

Dan Mason

Lead Inspector:



Operations:

Marshall Miller

2-3287

2-4002





INSPECTION RECOMMENDATION

Fixed Equip. Reliability **Equipment Reliability Group** Richmond Refinery, Richmond CA

i. RECO IDENTIFICATION (PAGE 2):

RECO #: 1621-03-03-27--#1 Lead Line PPT #: 28110507 Date Written: 3/27/03

Information / Recommendations
Required Work
6) Replace approx. 800 ft. of corroded pipe in several locations per ABO pipe class.
7) Clean & coat several locations per spec. 1.8. Contact inspection after cleaning the line.
8) Excavate or replace per ABO pipe class one buried location.
4) 00171 777

- 1) COMPLETE: Day light to remove foliage and soil in seven locations, remove one failed rubber sleeve seal to complete inspection.
- 2) COMPLETE: Lift the line and block it up for inspection in one location.
- 3) COMPLETE: Repair one leaking fitting.

Recommended Work

- 4) Install supports as needed in three locations.
- 5) Install reinforcement on two branch connections. Install elbows on two un-reinforced branch connections and eliminate two associated dead legs per ABO pipe class.

ERG (FER - - Reco Form)

Form Rev. 12/01

Request Date : 08/28/06 Time : 06:34 WORK REQUEST Originator : TYREE S 28110507 Facility : RI Unit: 1621 Orig Dept:CNTR PRINTED: 08/28/06 **.** PAGE : 1 Status = ORIG Priority : D Nuclear-Only Information: Applicable Mode Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) : Work Against Information: Op Sys: Division:2BT Area: System: Class : Equip :222 1621-002 Comp:222 1621-002-011 Name : #1 LEAD AVGAS LINE : UNKNOWN Mfr. Model No.: UNKNOWN : UNK-1621-002-011 Serial UTC No. : 1002026649 PEG Equip Tag : 1002026649 Eq Alt Tag: Location : **#1 LEAD AVGAS LINE** Client/Act: Reg Unit : · Reg Comp : Defect/Request: #1 LEAD LINE INSPECTION RESULTS Deficiency Tag/Locn: Work Request Details: Planning Ctr: Planner : Unit Cond Rq: Need Date : 09/18/06 Project : Discipline: Outage : Trbl/Brkdown: N Train Ops Review:

Detailed Explanation :

REC-55216 NEED DATE = DESIRED DATE.

REFERENCE DOC. 1621-03-03-27--#1 LEAD LINE
REQUIRED WORK

- 6) REPLACE APPROX. 800 FT. OF CORRODED PIPE IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS PER ABO PIPE CLASS.
- 7) CLEAN & COAT SEVERAL LOCATIONS PER SPEC. 1.8 CONTACT INSPECTION AFTER CLEANING THE LINE.
- 8) EXCAVATE OR REPLACE PER ABO PIPE CLASS ONE BURIED LOCATION.

RECO'S 1, 2, & 3 ARE COMPLETE.

RECOMMENDED WORK

- 4) INSTALL SUPPORTS AS NEEDED IN THREE LOCATIONS.
- 5) INSTALL REINFORCEMENT ON TWO BRANCH CONNECTIONS.


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
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
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
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Important Reminders:

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Chevron Products Company P. O. Box 1272
Richmond, CA 94802-0272
Tel 510 242 1400
Fax 510 242 5353
hink@chevron.com

August 22, 2008

Ms. Carla Fritz
Cal OSHA Compliance Engineer
Department of Industrial Relations
Northern California Process Safety Management
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520

Cal OSHA Document Request #2 Regarding TEL Facility Investigation

Dear Ms. Fritz:

Please find the attached documents satisfying Cal OSHA's original Document Request dated 8/13/2008 related to the complaint of alleged unsafe working conditions at our tetraethyl lead (TEL) Unloading Facility. The responses below address your questions seriatim. The first page of each document is identified with the corresponding item number.

Per your 8/22/08 email to Peter Sarmicanic, a postmark deadline extension until Friday, August 29, 2008 for Item #7, included in the amended document request letter dated 8/18/08 (copy attached), was granted. Documents satisfying Item #7 will be sent separately next week.

- 1) Disposition of all recommendations generated pursuant to the PHA's for the *Temporary TEL Blending Facility*
 - a. Disposition of recommendations are included in Attachment 1, PHA Recommendation Tables.
- 2) Stage 2 Training & Communication Review section of MOC # 17470
 - a. The MOC was updated to reflect the training date(s) and duration.
- 3) Disposition of Inspection Recommendation W/R 28096720 (06/05) to replace A-Drum nozzle N-3
 - a. Inspection Reco 6-23-05

Ms. Carla Fritz Department of Industrial Relations Northern California Process Safety Management August 22, 2008 Page 2

b. Disposition:

- The immediate response included increasing monitoring of the N-3 nozzle thickness to a quarterly frequency with instructions from ABU management to take the vessel out of service immediately if the nozzle reached the minimum allowable thickness, consistent with the Refinery's Safety Tenets. These inspections showed nozzle thicknesses above the minimum allowable thickness while the vessel remained in operation.
- Scoping for the nozzle replacement began immediately. Options considered included replacing the nozzle, replacing the vessel and permanently taking the system out of service and exiting the aviation gasoline (AvGas) business. Chevron currently supplies about 75% of all aviation gasoline used in California.
- In August 2006 a Senior Engineer performed calculations that supported a fitness for service approach and determined the N-3 nozzle minimum allowable thickness to be 0.10 inch.
- Replacing the nozzle on the existing vessel was not feasible due to vessel design (internal coating) and safety concerns related to repairing a vessel that could not be cleaned properly for repairs. A decision was made to install a temporary TEL injection system for use while a new AvGas plant was designed and constructed, which included taking A-drum out of service.
- In June 2007 when the nozzle spool failed, a temporary leak repair was made using a composite wrap to allow the drum level to be lowered to minimum level. The drum was then isolated from service until it could be removed during the cut-over of the new TEL off-loading facilities, scheduled for 1st Quarter 2009. At this point the Richmond Refinery stopped blending avgas until the temporary TEL off-loading system was placed in serviced 10/31/07.
- 4) All recommendations generated pursuant to the 6/05 identification of A-Drum "severely corroded" outlet piping & external corrosion "in all nozzles"
 - a. EWO B05-15, dated 8/1/05
 - b. Inspection Reco -6-20-07
 - c. Description:
 - Operations elected to replace all of the overhead pipe per EWO B05-015.
 - The 6/20/07 Inspection Recommendation was for a failed nozzle spool that had not been identified or tracked as part of A-Drum nozzles or piping. The spool is shown on the drawing attached to this recommendation and it is not shown on the drawing attached to the 6/23/05 recommendation. This nozzle spool is flanged to the vessel and the outlet piping and extends into the vessel, nearly to the bottom, as a

Ms. Carla Fritz Department of Industrial Relations Northern California Process Safety Management August 22, 2008 Page 3

"Dip Pipe". The small spool was temporarily repaired with a composite wrap.

- 5) All inspection records generated pursuant to the discovery of A-Drum nozzle leak and subsequent repair
 - a. History Brief A-Drum
 - b. RT Exam Records 9/2007 to 8/2008
 - c. Description:
 - The A-Drum nozzle leak referenced in the Document Request, was not in fact a nozzle leak, but instead a small spool leak as described above. The History Brief regarding the A-drum nozzle inspections and the inspection records are attached as requested, although the nozzle did not leak.
- 6) Personal air monitoring results for TEL conducted during the revised TEL offload/blending procedure, "Detailed Air Monitoring Results by Substance and Employee Chevron Custom Report"
- 7) Inspection report of 06/29/07 for the 1-Lead line ("replace 700 ft")
 - a. Documents satisfying Item #7 will be sent separately next week.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mark Robinson of my staff at (510) 242-2233.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By Richard Quiroz

T. A. Lizarraga

Attachments

bcc:

MRobinson

JBuchanan

ш

RBasco MBrennan

MDI CILIIA

PCanzius

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www.dir.ca.gov cfritz@dir.ca.gov

via email to: sarmipn@chevron.com

08/13/08

DOCUMENT REQUEST

(Amended 08/18/08)

TO:

Mark Robinson, Safety Team Lead

Chevron Products Co.

VIA:

Peter Sarmicanic, Field Safety Coordinator

FROM:

Carla Fritz

Cal OSHA Compliance Engineer

SUBJ:

Document Request 2 re: Complaint of Unsafe Working Conditions

Tetraethyl Lead Work Practices – Blending & Shipping

Thank you for providing the previously requested documents. My review of those documents has generated an additional request. Please provide the following documents postmarked no later than 08/24/08.

- 1) Disposition of all recommendations generated pursuant to the PHA's for the Temporary TEL Blending Facility
- 2) MOC # 17470 training date(s) & duration
- 3) Disposition of Inspection Recommendation W/R 28096720 (06/05) to replace A-Drum nozzle N-3
- 4) Any & all recommendations generated pursuant to 6/05 identification of A-Drum "severely corroded" outlet piping & external corrosion "in all nozzles"
- 5) Any & all inspection records generated pursuant to discovery of A-Drum nozzle leak & subsequent repair
- 6) Any & all current monitoring data conducted during the revised TEL offload/blending procedure

7) Inspection report of 06/29/07 for 1-Lead line ("replace 700 ft")

Thank you in advance for your continued cooperation in this investigation.

Carla Fritz

No. CA Process Safety Management (925) 602-5779 (925) 602-2668 (fax)

Ref: 311070239

Recommendations

•	An existing Job Aid and training already address the operation of pump P-7.	Consequences: 24.9.1.1		6. Acd sub-sted to this one with details to shutting cown P.7.	6. Addisibles
	Having tools and kerosene is part of the normal job duties for connecting the loading arm, and therefore is not a separate procedural step.	Consequences:		Add a steprio bing tools and bucket of ferosene to the top of the railcar.	5 Acid a stel
	Prior to commissioning and starting up the temporary facility, a step was added to the procedure to inspect the ramp for safe operation.	Consequences:		Add arstep, folinspecythe ramp for damage before lowering onto rail call.	4. Add astel
	Prior to commissioning and starting up the temporary facility, a step was added to the procedure for the RHO to visually inspect, ground, and release 50 track and railcar for offloading.	Consequences: 8.1.1.1, 8.9.1.1, 9.9.1.1	property, grounded, secured and throberty isolated for.	Consider adding a step to have the HC verify that the railcatis properly groun filoading	3 Consider of tiloading
	There was already a step in the Avgas Blending procedure to turn the mixers on. Therefore the mixers will already be running and confirmed when operator is adding the lead.	Consequences: 2.9.1.1		2. Add step.in.procedure to startminer or confirm that the mixen is running.	2. Addistep
•	There was already a step in the procedure stating, "Sign and approve Aviation Ethylization Report." RHO (Refined Head Operator)	Consequences: 1.1.1.1	eport/accument for HOI signature	induderstep: In beginning of procedure to prepäre. Ethylization Report docume	T (nature sie
	Disposition in the second of t	Place(s) Used	Max	Recommendations	

Recommendations

, .			いっぱい かんかん かいけい かいこう かいこうしゅう かんしょう かんしょう しゅうしゅう しゅうしゅ しゅうしゅ かいかい かいかい かんしゅ かいかい ファイン・カー・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン・ファイン
	B) The line is wrapped and sleeved where it crosses under the roadway. The replacement and re-routing of the line is included as part of the new facility, which will be completed during 1Q 2009.		A: Consider removing the A drum prior to starting the new ethylizing system. B. Consider reporting or replacing the 1-Lead line prior to starting up the temporary TEL facility.
	A) See item (1) concerning the removal of the TEL A-drum:	Consequences: 1.1.3.1	6 Concert isthe possible impactor affre involving the Adrium from an avgasteak under the road; above the lead building.
	The piping changes did not increase the likelihood for more leaks, and therefore did not necessitate a modification to the area drainage pattern. Design considerations for environmental compliance require water runoff to be contained for testing prior to discharge to the Refinery's effluent system.	Consequences: 4.14.3.1	5. Concern (is that the ITEL skid dialns) to the sump under A. Drum which would directary fire to a more. hazardous location is a second to the A.D. Consider Is a safe sump from the A.D. Lum sump.
	easier. Operability considerations were designed into the new facility, which incorporates these features. The Refinery's Fire Department reviewed the area with respect to the piping changes. Existing fire monitors were supplemented with additional dry chemical fire extinguishers.		D. Consider additional file protection for the rail car spot.
	A) The Refinery's existing procedures require annual replacement of hoses. B&C) The current loading arm arrangement didn't lend itself to significant design changes. Engineering and maintenance were consulted to improve operability. As a result, the counterweights and pulley were changed to make the arm slide	Consequences: 4:14.1.1, 4.14.2.1	4. Concern is the potential railure of the hose during agas wash reading to affice involving the A-Brum. A*Consider redesigning hose arrangement to reduce possibility of failure B*Consider redesigning hose arrangement to reduce possibility of failure Cafinvestigate the possibility of registrong hoses with a more robust method off connecting to the rail car.
's :	Step #12 in the off-loading checklist states, "Ensure T-3214 is set to circulate via T-3214 fill and the 1 lead." This covers the operator going out and checking. This is consistent with the Refinery's normal blending procedures, and is accepted industry practice.	Consequences: 1.1.1.1	3. Concern is that PPT is circulated for 2 hours within operator in afterdance and the searcould fail if the succious at the tank were closed. The tank yalves are controlled by a different operator and there is no alarmonship town device to alert the operator or protect the pump. \$ Add as tep in the blending procedure to lock 1.3214, alves locen and itag. Blend in Progress "while blending assume or install some type of alarm to alert the operators.
	Labels were installed prior to start-up and commissioning.	Consequences: 1.17.1.1	2 installiabels for the modified facility when the changes have been made.
	It was the determined that the safest way to remove the TEL drum would be to integrate its removal with the installation of the new TEL loading facility. Having the new facility in place will affect the safest conversion and cutover. The TEL drum was put into a safe posture by pumping it down to a minimal level and preserving a liquid layer over the bottom, in preparation for removal during 10, 2009.	Consequences:	1. Concern, is the possible impact of affire involving the A-drumin a significant leak develops in the area is of Standard Road just above the TELShed. Of Standard Road just above the TELShed. Consider removing the A-drum phor to starting up the new temporary ethylizing system.
	Bisposition	Place(s) Used	Recommendations

ile Name: TEL Facility PHA.pha

Stage Two Training and Communication Review

8/21/2008 4:37:50 PM

1	Identify	the affected	employees.
v	Juchuly	me anecieu	emproyees.

- * Maintenance and Technical affected?
- * Employee who will require training to start up the change based on the level of training.
- * Employees who will receive training after the start up BUT

before they can perform work affected by the change

- ✓ Procedures have been modified/written (Ops/SSO/Trainer)
- ✓ Identify the affected employees..
 - Lesson plan cover sheet (includes training objective statement and list of affected employees)
 - * Procedural changes (Standing Orders, mark-ups)
 - * Flow daigrams (final or mark-ups)
- Determine level of training
- ▼ Training has been scheduled
- Affected employees have been trained in order to start up the change.

MOC No:	17470
Date Completed:	10/25/2007
Completed By:	Prather, Seth A.
Person Responsible:	Prather, Seth A.
Project/Equipm	ent Title:
T&B / Ethyl Plant	/Tetra Ethyl Lead Injection System

Summary of Review:

Tetraethyl lead is stored in 'A' Drum located in the ethyl plant, behind the D&R offices. This vessel is approaching end of life, and will no longer be used to store TEL for the purpose of blending aviation gasoline. A new TEL injection system has been designed to bypass 'A' drum and inject TEL from a railcar directly into the avgas blend circulation stream. The scope of this project includes: fabrication & installation of a new vacuum eductor system, identification of tie-in locations, and guidance for required structural steel. Please review the EOM for new procedures, checklists, routine duties and drawings. Operation of the Lead skid constitutes a fundamental change in the way Tetraethyl lead is introduced into the blend tank by removing the need for a weigh tank. All qualified MTF personnel will receive training on setup and operation prior to being released to operate the new facility

Update added on 8-20-08:

The training was instructor-lead and was performed in the field by a qualified trainer using the updated off-loading procedure. The training took about 2 hours and all operators qualified on the MTF job were trained. No one was allowed to perform the new off-loading procedure until they were trained.

Training was performed on a individual basis from 9/27/07 through 10/24/07. A signed attendance list is available from the Development Dept.





INSPECTION RECOMMENDATION


Fixed Equip. Reliability Equipment Reliability Group Richmond Refinery, Richmond CA

I. RECO IDENTIFICATION:

					
RECO #:	A-DrumInsp06-0	05 W/R #:	28096720	Date Written:	6/23/05
Plt. Eqp. #: Brass Tag#:	Ethyl Plant A-Drum Lead (TEL)	PRIORITY Immediate Action Planned Shutdow X Next Opportunity Routine	RECO TO Information X Eng. Req Eng. Not Other	on Only Utilities uired Hydro	ZONE
	MENT OF CHANGE:				
Level 1 Revie NO Will no NO Is this NO Does NO Does NO Will the	ew Summary new feeds, chemicals or catalysts be nis work lead to operation outside es s repair or replacement other than "Ir this involve developing new and / or this work involve the addition of new nis impact upstream or downstream p	stablished limits? Which Equipolation. The modifying existing procedure? wequipment? (Send copy of the plants? If "YES" then which	e MOC form to EAD for no	List Equipment if Yes	
If any of the above questions were answered "YES", then a Level 2 review is required. III. RECO INFORMATION (Summary and Details):					
A-Drum External In Lieu Inspection Results. REC-44234 Information					
thicknee found to Nozzle (2") was 0.14" (1 The rac nozzle of 0.22". To list of re Require 1) Repla	Drum was visually inspenses since the last inspenses since the last inspenses since a wall thickness where a wall thickness was radiographed and has radiographed and has radiograph for N-4 (6") resinto the vessel. The was rediographs revealed work: The radiographs revealed work: The comment work in this lnspection raft Quality Assurance	ection in 1994. The is of 1.62". In the second and a wall this moderate to seven ment is required. The vealed the 2" pipe of all thickness for the ed external corrosion ded repairs. Recommendation is second.	the second of th	I) was UT scanned was found. Nozzle osion a wall thicknes also severely coalso goes through thickness for the 2 zles. The following	and #N-3 ess of prroded. the 6" ?" is g is a
Cost Estima			Total abor Cost: I		otal ost:
V. RECO APP Area Inspector Lead Inspector		Phone		er Ibrahim 2	Phone 2-2508 2-4002

3) a.

Form Rev. 12/01



History Brief

For Location ID: 1621-002-015



Réport Date: May 31, 2006

Date Available:

History Brief ID:

In- Service Date:

Reference Material:

Incident Event ID:

Inspection Date:

Inspection Type:

Critical:

Brief Data:

Date Not Available: 8/1/2005 History Brief Date: 10/06/2005

Event Type: Repair

1621-002-015 **Equipment ID:** 1002026653 Asset ID:

Work Order Nbr:

History Type: FXD

222 Asset Type: RRI00371 **Cost Center:**

Unit:

1621 - LOWER MAIN TANK FIELD

Headline:

Replaced Internally Corroded Pipe.

Reliability Analysis:

Event Type: Cause Category: Repair Information

Corrosion

Effect Category: Repair Location:

Temporary Repair:

Save:

Worked Performed By:

Program Status:

Maintainable Item:

Permanent Repair WO:

Name:

Inspected By:

Chevron - General

08/01/2005 VI-0510135793

08/01/2005

08/01/2005

Pipe

STYR STYR

Findings:

PCA ID: Inspectable:

Sub Item: Part:

Discussion:

Condition: Action: Location:

Damage Mechanism: PCA Work Order No:

Reliability Comments:

The radiographs of the A-Drum nozzles (performed as part of the vessel inspection) found internal corrosion. The inspection was expanded to include the piping coming off of the vessel. The piping had corroded to 0.04" in one location & 0.08 in one other location. Inspection REC-36738 (see 1621-002-010 for inspection REC) was up-dated 7/20/05 to replace the line in five locations. Operations elected to replace all of the over head pipe per B&S EWO B05-015 on 8/1/05.

Last Update: May 31, 2006 © 2005 Chevron Corporation Content Owner: MERCAB

Technical Owner: Rahul Doshi

Page 2 of 5

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B&S EV	VO#:	B05-015	F	REV:	. 0
PLANT: #2 Avg	gas at Ethyl Bldg	SAP COST CENTER:	DWR	RI-00371	***
W/O #:	Project #:		ITEM:	* ***	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
EQUIP. NO. OR Re	place and modify section	s of 2"-Avgas L	ine at the	Ethyl Mix	Building
DESCRIPTION: La	cludes the 3"f	Dipe	2		
MOC#: 15036		0			
	Level 1 - Managemer	nt of Change Rev	view		
Will This Change:					
<u></u>	e the use of different feeds		•		
Yes Cause the use of different process conditions, instrumentation, Process control or affect upstream/downstream plants?					
Yes Cause the use of new or modified equipment (which is other than in-kind)					
Yes Equipment siting, building, trailer locations, roads or fire protection?					
Yes Require modifying existing and/or developing new procedures?					
Yes Is this	an organizational change	that will affect en	nployee e	mergency re	esponse?
A Level 2 review is required for any "YES" answer.					
SAFETY OPERATOR RE	EQ'D? IN VOC SI	ERVICE?	IN P	LANT WE	LDING?
X Yes No	X Yes	☐ No	X	Yes _	No
ENGINEER: Noer Ibra	· IDEK - PIPA		5 PHON	E: 2	-2508
of?	APPRO	VALS			
LEAD ENGINEER: K_{Q}	n WRon Post	DATE: %	1/05	PHONE:	2-5170
OPERATIONS: Don Edlinger DATE: 8/1/05 PHONE: 2-2395				2-2395	
maintenance: U					
		,			
· ·				·	
	See scope o	of work:			
	orkamplet	e			

CC: D.Edlinger (1), Jeff Lowe (3), S.Tyree (1), Noer Ibrahim (1+ Original)

Remember Safety or be Remembered!

4) b.

B & S #2 Avgas line EWO #B05-015, Rev.0 Page 2 of 3

SUMMARY

The Ethyl Mix Plant Lines were visually inspected from The Vent Seal (D-526) and the A-Drum (Ethyl Plant), Off Loading Line and Circulation Line per the API-570 ten year Inspection requirements. Radiographs were taken in several locations. The 2 inch pipe is corroding internally at 0.15 inch wall, 0.05 inch pitting, 0.10 inch RWT, throwaway at 0.10 inch, replacement is required.

SCOPE OF WORK

- Remove/replace 2 inch line identified on Iso.#1622-001-015.
- Use 2"- Sch.80 CS Pipe, the rest of piping material refer to Pipe Class ABO.
- New pipe shall be shop fab., hydro tested to 450 Psig and on site before job is scheduled.
- 5% Random Butt weld.
- Chevron to provide all staging as required.
- PRIOR TO COMMENCE WORK, ALL PERSONNEL ENTERING THE JOB SITE ARE REQUIRED TO WEAR PPE.

Existing pipe removal guidelines

- Joint Job Site Visit is mandatory with Ops. prior to starting work.
- All piping system are very corroded internally and full of scale.
- Upon removal of existing pipe, immediately tape off both ends with plastic and duct tape.
 All existing pipe will be placed in "<u>Drums</u>". This will require all pieces of pipe to be no more than <u>31 inches</u> long after taping. Ops. will mark line with "Cut Tape" prior to cutting.
- Set up decontamination area with 2 swimming pools. Tools can be cleaned using dish soap with a bath of bleach water as last step. Other alternative is to use kerosene/pearl oil as the soap.
- Ethyl plant has a safety shower and a shower in the office room.
- All used PPE will be placed in a drum as Hazardous Waste,

MATERIALS

All piping materials are per piping class AB0.

INSTALLATION AND WELDING REQUIREMENTS

- 1. All pipe welding shall be done in accordance with ANSI B-31.3, Latest Edition and the Chevron Metals Craft Manual.

 AF1 UT
- 2. Piping construction shall meet Chevron Piping Classification And welded.
- 3. Welding of pressured pipe shall be per Chevron Welding Procedure WPS 10.

INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Hydro test shall be in accordance with Chevron Procedure PIM-EF-121.
- 2. Hydro test pressure for Piping Classification to 450 PSIG.

1125 NJ

Remember Safety or Be Remembered


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
B & S #2 Avgas line EWO #B05-015, Rev.0 Page 3 of 3


ATTACHED DRAWINGS and OTHER DOCUMENTS


CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS, SPECIFICATIONS and PROCEDURES	DESCRIPTION / COMMENTS
Dwg. 1621-001-015	Inspection Isometric drawing
Dwg. D-338942	P&ID, Avgas-Lead, Dye and Additive System
Chevron Piping Classification AB0	Pipe construction shall be welded, available on request
Chevron Weld Specification WPS 10	SMAW w/ E-6010/E-7018 for pipe, available upon request
DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCE (not included)	DESCRIPTION/COMMENTS
Chevron Procedure PIM-EF-121	Field Hydrostatic Test Schedule, 10 pages
Chevron Metals Craft Manual	Pipe Welding, Fabrication, QC & Documentation Requirements


Remember Safety or Be Remembered











4) b.






INSPECTION RECOMMENDATION

Fixed Equip. Reliability Equipment Reliability Group Richmond Refinery, Richmond CA

I. RECO IDENTIFI	CATION:			·····					
RECO #:	A-DrumFailedNozzle	W/R #: 281	19847	Date Written: [6/20/07				
Plant: <i>Ethy</i> Plt. Eqp. #: <i>A-Di</i> Brass Tag#:		PRIORITY Immediate Action Planned Shutdown Next Opportunity Routine	RECO TY Information X Eng. Requ Eng. Not R	n Only Utilities	T. ZONE				
Service: Lead	i (TEL)								
II. MANAGEMENT	OF CHANGE:								
Level 1 Review Summary NO Will new feeds, chemicals or catalysts be used? (See RI-313 for new chemicals, Oprs. Coord for new feeds) NO Will this work lead to operation outside established limits? Which Equipment? NO Is this repair or replacement other than "In-kind"? NO Does this involve developing new and / or modifying existing procedure? NO Does this work involve the addition of new equipment? (Send copy of the MOC form to EAD for new equipment) NO Will this impact upstream or downstream plants? If "YES" then which Plants? If any of the above questions were answered "YES", then a Level 2 review is required.									
III. RECO INFORM	ATION (Summary and De	tails):			····				
2	Replace failed 3" nozz	le on A-Drum. REC-6	2457						
		Information							
The 3" nozzle (3" nozzle drops down through 6" #4 nozzle) on the A-Drum failed at the top weld; Replacement is required. Code weld procedures are required. Required Work: 1) Replace 3" nozzle (N-4) per Engineering specs. See ISO markup on M-Drive "A-DRUM 3IN NOZZLE" for repair location. All hot work in this Inspection Recommendation is subject to the "Richmond Refinery – Metal Craft Quality Assurance Procedures Manual;									
Cost Estimate b	y: Total y: Man-Days	Cost per Man-Day La	Total abor Cost: I	Total M'tri. Cost:	Total Cost:				
V. RECO APPROVAL (Enter Name & Phone):									
A	Name	Phone		Name	Phone				
Area Inspector:	Shirley Tyree Dan Mason			er Ibrahim shall Miller	2-2508 2-4002				
Lead Hispector.	Dali WaSUII		ALIONS. IVIARS	snan winer	Z-400Z				

4) c.

PAGE 1 of 1



History Brief

For Location ID: A-DRUM



Data Source: Meridium

Report Date: August 18, 2008

Brief Data:

Date Not Available: 6/20/2007

History Brief Date: 06/20/2007 Event Type: Failure

Equipment ID:

A-DRUM D-7143

FXD

252

Asset ID: Work Order Nbr:

History Type:

Asset Type:

Cost Center:

Unit:

Headline:

Event Type: Cause Category:

Effect Category:

Repair Location:

3" vapor pipe failed (3" inside 6" #4 nozzle)

Reliability Analysis:

RRI00371

Information

Leak

Temporary Repair: No

Save:

Failure

Maintainable Item: Permanent Repair WO:

1615 - ETHYL PLANT / NO. 20 PUMP STATION

Name:

Inspected By:

Date Available:

History Brief ID:

In- Service Date:

Reference Material:

Worked Performed By:

Program Status:

Incident Event ID:

Inspection Date:

Inspection Type:

Critical:

06/20/2007

06/20/2007

06/20/2007

Other

Nozzles

VI-0706177859

STYR STYR

Condition:

Action: Location:

Damage Mechanism: PCA Work Order No:

Findings:

PCA ID: **Inspectable:** Sub Item:

Part:

Discussion:

Reliability Comments:

UPDATE 6/21/07; the pipe was leak sealed with a fiberglass wrap per LSR 17165.

The 3" pipe appeared to be leaking from the top weld on the 3" vapor pipe. Further investigation will be performed when the fresh air requirement is lifted.

Last Update: August 18, 2008 © 2005 Chevron Corporation

Content Owner: MERCAB Technical Owner: Rahul Doshi

Page 1 of 4 Company Confidential

	MADIC	MANDO	4PM		ICKNESS EXAMINATION RECORD
Unit	SYSTEM AND DWG. NO.	TML	PIPE SIZE	RT THICK- NESS	DATE: 9-20-07 Page: of of
BAS	1015A-000				PLANT: B\$S \$20 Pomp Station
(RT CONTRACTOR: P.J.S.
		a	9/4"	./2	RADIOGRAPHER: M. Vientel LEVEL:
		N.2.0 N.2.90		145	ASSISTANT: T. Shwafz LEVEL:
			2"	144	997 TECHNIQUE DATA
		N-3-98	2 "	014	INSPECTION SPECIFICATIONS: COST. Judo
		24-00		.48	PT PPOCEDURE NO. S/A R/S POC
	>	1-1-90	6	430	SOURCE 192 SOURCE ACTIVITY: 6 Bui KV
					SOURCE TO FILM DIST Varies
					MATERIAL THICKNESS: Vaner Type MATERIAL:
			\mathcal{A}	- 1	THICKNESS COMPARATOR: STANDARD 0.10" FILM TYPE: 0-7
					EXPOSURE TIME: Varies DEV. TIME: 5mca
		/			EXPOSURE SKETCH OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
					SOURCE METHOD METHOD OPTIONAL SOURCE B. SOURCE COCATION SOURCE FILM FILM FILM CONTACT EXPOSURE METHOD FILM FILM CONTACT EXPOSURE
	/			CC	DMMENTS:
					Perform RT. per-S. Tyres on N-2,3 & 4- Also D.I. Small bore pipins.
					Deposits de Corrosion in all locations.
MED BY:	m			SNT	DATE: 9.20.07 5) b.

Unit	SYSTEM AND DWG. NO.	TML	PIPE SIZE	RT THICK- NESS	DATE: 1/7/08 Page: 1 of 1 PROJECT NO: 26231521-01 SITE: CUSA
1615	A-DRUM	NZ	6"		PLANT: # 20 Dung State 1115 1 22
1 1		00			PLANT: # 20 pump Station / 1615-A-DRUM RT CONTRACTOR: T.C.I
+		900		.46	
+-+		N3	2"		RADIOGRAPHER: J. SILVA LEVEL: III
1-1		90		-16	ASSISTANT: C. Padilla LEVEL: I
		NY	6"	.17	TECHNIQUE DATA
,		00	-		INSPECTION SPECIFICATIONS: Cust. Info
5	A-DRUM	900		.45	RT PROCEDURE NO: TC-RT-ASME-4 REVISION: 2
					SOURCE: IR 192 SOURCE ACTIVITY: 8860 KV -
					SOURCE TO FILM DIST: 28" SOURCE TO OBJECT DIST: 21"
		\leftarrow			MATERIAL THICKNESS: 300/ 190 TYPE MATERIAL: C/5
				7	HICKNESS COMPARATOR: STANDARD 0.10", FILM TYPE: 10-7
	_/			E	XPOSURE TIME: 2min DEV. TIME: 5 min
	-	_			
_	1				EXPOSURE SKETCH OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 常 SOURCE 常 METHOD METHOD
					WIETHOD OPTIONAL SOURCE
			-	- (B. SOUNCE LOCATION SX
					ILM FILM SOURCE S
	+			<u>w</u>	ALL EXPOSURE FILM FILM
-	1		-		CONTACT EXPOSURE
					METHOD FILM FILM C. ELLIPTICAL EXPOSURE
				COM	ELLIPTICAL EXPOSURE IMENTS:
				CON	INICH (S)
 		_			
 					
	+		 		
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		,			

	RADIOGRAPHIC THICKNESS EXAMINATION RECORD									
UNIT NO.	SYSTEM AND DWG, NO.	POINT NO.	PIPE SIZE	RT THICKNESS	DATE: 728-08 Page: of					
20	1615-A-DRUM	NZ	B.11	0°.50	PLANT: # 10 RT CONTRACTOR: TC TUSPECTION					
20	1615-A Devm	ŊЗ	2"	0°.70 90°.13	RADIOGRAPHER: SHAUN WEUS LEVEL: TECHNIQUE DATA					
20	1615-A-DRUM	NY	6"	0° .48 90°,49	INSPECTION SPECIFICATIONS: ASMEJZ RT PROCEDURE NO: REVISION: SOURCE; IR 192 SOURCE ACTIVITY: 35 KV — SOURCE TO FILM DIST; VAR. SOURCE TO OBJECT DIST: VAR.					
					MATERIAL THICKNESS: VAR. TYPE MATERIAL: 615					
					THICKNESS COMPARATOR: STANDARD 0.10" FILM TYPE: EXPOSURE TIME: VARIED DEV. TIME: 5MNB 68"F					
					EXPOSURE SKETCH OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SOURCE METHOD A. B. SOURCE					
REVIEW	ED BY:		/ /	5	SNT LEVEL: 128-08 5)6.					

	RADI	OGF	RAPHIC T	HICKNESS EXAMINATION RECORD	FormO7ac (an90)
SYSTEM AND DWG. NO.	POINT NO.	PIPE SIZE 6" 2" 2" 2"	RT	DATE: AMG 06 2008 Page: 1 of PROJECT NO: 26231521-01 SITE: CUSA PLANT: 1615 A DRUM RT CONTRACTOR: TO INSPECTION S INC. RADIOGRAPHER: JOHN SILVA LEVEL: 11 ASSISTANT: ANTHONY DUPINE LEVEL: 1 TECHNIQUE DATA INSPECTION SPECIFICATIONS: ASME SELV RT PROCEDURE NO. TO PLANT REVISION: GOOD SOURCE: 1912 SOURCE ACTIVITY: 50 ci. KV: - SOURCE: 1912 SOURCE ACTIVITY: 50 ci. KV: - SOURCE TO FILM DIST: YAPIOUSSOURCE TO OBJECT DIST: WARZING MATERIAL THICKNESS: VARPIOUS TYPE MATERIAL: C/S THICKNESS COMPARATOR: STANDARD 0.10" FILM TYPE: PERPOSURE TIME: 6 MIN. DEV. TIME: 5 MIN COMPANDITIONAL INFORMATION EXPOSURE SKETCH OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION METHOD METHOD METHOD OPTIONAL SOURCE METHOD OPTIONAL SOURCE METHOD METHOD OPT	DUS 7 8°F
				WALL EXPOSURE FILM FILM FILM FOR CONTACT EXPO	ILM DSURE
				COMMENTS:	
EVIEWED BY:				SNT LEVEL: DATE:	<u>J</u> .

Detailed Air Monitoring Results by Substance and Employee - Chevron Custom Report

Chevron

Sample Date Range from 07/30/2008 to 08/19/2008 Location: RICHIMOND, CA

Approved = YesRejected $= N_0$

TETRAETHYL LEAD AS PB

7/30/2008 322735

Diaz, Eliseo

CONTRACTOR, REF

184

TEL railcar unloading at Ethyl

TWA 0.075 mg/m3

< 0.0021 mg/m3

TWA 0.075 mg/m3

Comments: Stand-by for operators connecting the hose to TEL railcar that took approximately 20 minutes. Stand-by stayed near area during the unloading that lasted approximately 2 hours. < 0.0021 mg/m3 TEL railcar unloading at Ethyl

TWA

Comments: Connecting hose to TEL railcar took approximately 20 minutes. Operators stayed near area during the unloading that lasted approximately 2 hours. Disconnecting the hose took approximately OPERATOR Reyes, Bernabe

189

OPERATOR TRAINE

Ma, Jonathan

7/30/2008

322734

7/30/2008

322733

20 minutes.

Disconnecting the hose took approximately 20 minutes.

Railcar at Ethyl Plant using

193

0.075 mg/m3 < 0.0021 mg/m3

Comments: Connecting hose to TEL railcar took approximately 20 minutes. Operators stayed near area during the unloading that lasted approximately 2 hours. Disconnecting the hose took approximately 20 minutes. temporary system

3:59 pm 8/19/2008